This is lightly edited and referenced version of a presentation given at the 20th
| INTRODUCTION
When thinking about how I could make best use of this kind invitation to speak, I recalled a conference (I won't say which) some years ago. Two plenary speakers stick in the memory. The first was a wellknown nurse academic, who gave every impression that he was speaking completely off the cuff. He was to the extent that there were no notes and plenty of animation, but it soon became apparent that this was because it was little more than an introductory lecture, probably delivered in the same way to lecture halls full of bemused first semester undergraduates every September for many years. I went to coffee wondering whether he was worth the airfare.
The second was a distinguished philosopher, and her paper was so dense and detailed that it passed straight over my head into the ether.
Unlike the first speaker, she was reading her paper aloud. But it was a paper written to be read, not listened to. The complex ideas needed pause, a re-read and thoughtful application, and because as the education literature tells us, we have limited concentration spans, not least in a crowded and warm conference hall, her ideas were quickly lost. In my presentation, I aimed to steer the middle ground between these positions. I don't think that I said much that you haven't already heard but it's good to pause and revisit Mill and ask if we can learn from how application of his thought is evolving. This paper is more of an extended editorial than an original contribution.
At the conference, I read the presentation, although I wrote it to be listened to. But "just" reading comes at price, something that Mill knew well. His home education consisted in large measure of discussions with his father, including reading aloud the works of the ancient Greeks, answering questions when asked. A passage from Mill's autobiography illustrates a difficulty and a more important point to come.
Mill senior paid a great deal of attention to elocution, perhaps at the expense of understanding, and this […] 
self, shewed me how it ought to be read. A defect running through his admirable modes of instruction, as it did through all his modes of thought, was that of trusting too much to the intelligibleness of the abstract, when not em-
bodied in the concrete. (Mill, 1989, p. 39-40 
emphasis in original)
Mill Senior was a theorist it seems, but his genius child appreciated the value of practical application. The relationship between theory and practice is a recurring theme, and this quotation is equally apt for conference presentations and more generally for nursing and nursing education. I want to consider briefly how and if detailed analyses of and adherence to historical philosophical texts can be of use to practicing nurses before speaking a little about Mill's famous harm principle and how it is being subverted, and I will illustrate this with some legal cases and policies. Finally, I will suggest that how nurses understand the limits of Mill's work tells us a great deal about the fundamental purpose of nursing-travelling, unlike Mill Senior, from practice to theory. I admit and apologize that the analysis is in a UK context, but the issues are international, and comparison would be very interesting.
| EVIDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY-UNEQUAL SIBLINGS
The use of evidence has been a part of nursing practice for some time now, although of course it is challenged and questioned, including recently in a book edited by Martin Lipscomb (Lipscomb, 2016) . Simply, what is supposed to happen is something like this: primary evidence, often research evidence, is located and appraised, and in many cases, this evidence is used to produce guidance which informs but does not dictate practice. There are other factors of course and these can operate at many levels. At the guideline level, this might include financial considerations or organizational values.
Other factors might affect an individual decision made by an individual nurse, but if she ventures outside the guideline, she will need to provide justification. This is very familiar for nurse educators, many of whom spend a good portion of their working lives helping students to understand the steps in the process. The relevant point is that individual nurses are not exhorted or expected, they are required to be proficient in understanding evidence, and that is why we spend so much time teaching it. Pre-registration students are not required to undertake original research but as well as following guidelines, they must be able to arrive at a view about whether the guideline is worth following, and they must be able to find primary research, appraise it and draw upon it in their practice. Now, as the chapters in Lipscomb's book show, this is far from being the whole story, but these requirements are there in regulatory and educational documents. You can point at them.
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How would it look if we replaced evidence with philosophy, the thing that examines the values, which I alluded to? The field is vast, but considering moral philosophy alone, an analogous system would require that nurses engage with primary texts and/or ideas, appraise them and use them to justify decisions. Of course that doesn't happen.
I am not saying that nurses are not allowed to do this, or that none do, I am saying that they aren't required to. Instead, guidelines, in the form of codes of ethics or conduct are produced, and despite their inadequacy (Snelling, 2016a; Snelling, 2017) , this seems to be enough. The standards for competence in the UK state that "All nurses must practice with confidence according to The Code, and within other recognized ethical and legal frameworks" (Nursing and Midwifery Council, 2015, p.13) . We can point at legal frameworks, but what is meant by recognized ethical frameworks, and recognized by whom? One framework seen in official documents 2 is the ubiquitous four principles (Beauchamp & Childress, 2013) . I am possibly in a minority when I say that I think that this approach is a useful place to start. It probably counts as a "recognized" framework, but one of its chief claimed advantages, which is also used as a critique, is that you do not have to go to philosophy and philosophical texts to understand it and use it. You understand that you should (or must) promote autonomy but not why you should (Clouser & Gert, 1990) . In that regard, philosophy is evidence's poor relation.
When we talked about returning to the philosophers at this conference, what did we mean, exactly? We probably did not mean that we can require our students or practicing nurses to return to them.
Do we expect writers-of-codes to return to them, or refer to them?
Possibly this is the case for ethics-code writers in Canada and the US, In the UK, the Nursing and Midwifery Council standards of competence for registered nurses state that "all nurses must: appreciate the value of evidence in practice, be able to understand and appraise research, apply relevant theory and research findings to their work, and identify areas for further investigation" (NMC, 2015, p.6) . These standards were initially published a standards for education but were later extended so that they apply to all registered nurses. but it certainly is not for the conduct-code writers in the UK. The two types of codes differ significantly (Snelling, 2016a (Snelling, 2016a) . What I am taking from this is that looking to the philosophers in great detail and then trying to apply their texts directly to practice is not likely to be helpful for most practicing nurses. Times change. So what I am going to do is suggest some areas of nursing practice that might be guided by John Stuart Mill's thought, or at least some of the many issues that he illuminated, and try to use them in practical application. This is not a detailed analysis, and I will not be trusting to the intelligibleness of the abstract.
| WHAT WOULD MILL SAY ABOUT SMOKING POLICIES?
For the rest of the paper, I will be discussing smoking. I am not a smoker myself, although I was one. I am not an apologist for it and I would be disappointed to discover that one of my children had started. But I think that smoking is an interesting subject to discuss for a number of reasons. First, from the perspective of orthodox health care, it is seen as a virtually undisputed bad thing-and this extends also to business practices of tobacco companies. Second, because things change rapidly; it was not so long ago that doctors' and nurses' images were advertising cigarettes (Gardner & Brandt, 2006) , and we have seen over the last 60 years or so how research has identified the link between smoking and ill health and continues to influence policy.
Third, smoking policy requires thought about so many important issues including the nature of agency and decision-making, understanding what is meant by health and how it differs from well-being, and the nature of toleration. How these and other issues relate to smoking can be seen as bellwethers for health care policy and more importantly for us, for nursing practice.
As almost all student public health essays include, the standard position against paternalism is that of John Stuart Mill in On Liberty, which has become known (although not by him) as the "harm principle":
[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral is not a sufficient warrant (Mill, 1991, p.10-11) Mill's famous claim underpins other more nuanced and developed positions, e.g., that taken by Joel Feinberg: (Feinberg, 1984, p.26 ).
It is always a good reason in support of penal legislation that it would probably be effective in preventing (eliminating, reducing) harm to persons other than the actor (the one prohibited from acting)…
Mill is not talking about "just" criminal prohibition, as is Feinberg in this passage. His proscription can be taken to include power exercised by any institution, and Mill also included the tyranny of "prevailing opinion and feeling." His remarks about the tyranny of society seem remarkably prescient applied to a Facebook generation and the public shaming that we read about in our newspapers and on line: (Mill, 1991, p.8-9) I am not saying that the harm principle is or should be absolute, regardless of what Mill would say about this (Jennings, 2009; Powers, Faden, & Saghai, 2012 (Mill, 1991, p. 111) (Mill, 1991, p.111) There are a number of parallels to contemporary smoking debates, but two are worthy of note First is the matter of intention. Mill is saying that taxation is acceptable, laudable even, when its function is to raise money, but not acceptable if its function is to reduce demand. The problem here is that these issues can be conflated. The World Health Organization (2015) very clearly says that increased price is a measure used to reduce demand, as do governments (Ekpu & Brown, 2015) . This is against Mill. But it has also been suggested that these taxation policies represent a "liberal egalitarian" approach to holding people responsible for their health-effecting behaviour, addressing, to varying degrees, the cost of treatment required (Cappelen & Norheim, 2005) .
I do not think that Mill would have a problem with that.
The second and perhaps more important consideration here is the statement that people should be free to spend their money, "after satisfying their legal or moral obligations to the State and to individuals." The link between law and morality is too complex to discuss in detail here, but the relationship need not be unpicked too far. I am not going to be able to spend much time talking about Mill's view of morality, and it has been noted that there can be tension between his two most famous works, On Liberty and Utilitarianism. His point is an interesting one because the precise nature of our obligations to individuals is not clear. My own view is that a decision to continue to smoke or drink is a moral choice, which requires consideration of the effect our potentially diminished physical health has on those who have a legitimate interest in it (Snelling, 2014) , and I am with Mill in saying that financial obligations also require consideration. This obligation has to be undertaken in the context of our own life and own version of the good life and need not be demanding. Mill was scathing about the effects that our habits have on others if these diminish our ability to fulfill our 5
There's also confusion about this word in respect to breaking a confidence, where some regulatory documents require disclosure to prevent harm, and others require the prevention of serious harm (Snelling, 2017) .
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Though see McDaniel, Smith, and Malone (2015) for a review of the "tobacco endgame"
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The same arguments are applied to other "bad" things including minimum price per alcohol unit, and "sugar tax."
obligations to them, but was clear that the wrongness was here, and not in the habit itself. 
| THE RAMPTON SMOKERS
In the UK from 1st July 2007, smoking was no longer permitted in enclosed or substantially enclosed public places and places of work. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Clearly, Article 8 does not simply mean that individuals are always allowed to do exactly as they wish in their homes, and whilst accepting that Rampton was the appellants' home, arguments were presented about the precise nature of the home and the nature of the act (smoking).
The majority conclusion was "Article 8 does not protect a right to smoke in Rampton." 12 The judgements are complex and long, and this is not a full commentary (and I am not a lawyer). Instead, I will present three areas of concern.
First, the relationship between the nature of a person's home and the nature of the act that he wishes to pursue in it is such that "the less the appellant can rely upon the nature of the place in which the activity is pursued, the more he must rely on the proximity of the activity to his personal identity or physical and moral integrity. The judgement accepts that smoking is covered under this regulation, but there is no reason to believe that the regulation regards smoking as self-harm. The word "smoking" does not appear in the regulation or its guidance notes. Self-harm is a difficult concept not least because of the potential to include a vast range of behaviours, but it would be an idiosyncratic understanding of the term that includes smoking. Some authors do regard smoking as self-harm, but this is restricted to where it is considered "excessive." (McAllister, 2003) Perhaps they mean that any smoking is excessive but it seems easy enough to draw a distinction between acute short-term harm 8 Today, the economic cost of obesity and smoking is prominent in policy documents, but the figures often fail to account for savings to the State due to early death (Tovey, 2017) . 9 Currently, prisoners can smoke in their cells, but stated policy is to move to completely smoke free prisons, implemented in stages (Woodall & Tattersfield, 2017) .
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The comparison between prisons and mental health units has proved irresistible to those who wish to ban smoking, perhaps more so where mental health patients in secure units have committed crimes. See Thomas and Richmond (2017) for arguments in favour of a ban.
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The UK voted to leave the European Union on 23rd June 2016, and Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, giving a maximum notice of two years to leave was invoked on 29th March 2017. from continual chain-smoking, and the cumulative harm of an occasional habit. Interpreting the regulation cited to justify preventing smoking by regarding it as self-harm is an attempt to present it as irrational which would be considered over-zealous if extended to other places. Under common law, I am justified in using reasonable force to disarm an individual to prevent him from cutting himself, but this does not extend to me snatching a cigarette from his lips and extinguishing it, along with a large chunk of his liberty, under the heel of my shoe.
Third and perhaps most important is the movement away from policy aims that echo Mill's justified restriction on liberty only to prevent harm to others, and towards the prevention of self-regarding harm, narrowly defined. Interference against an Article 8 right can be justified to protect the "freedoms of others" but this other-regarding criterion is not needed to justify interference for the purpose of the protection of "health or morals." They stand alone. This can also clearly be seen in a second case brought by a Scottish smoker.
The claimant, a man with schizophrenia, had been detained for 18 years following low-grade disorder offences for which he might have been imprisoned for a few months. In this case, the EHCR was found to have been breached. In fact, Lord Stewart reached the decision with some reluctance: This can be read as directly against the Millian harm principle.
However, he found for the claimant. In a sentence which seems destined to be much quoted he said that:
Article 8(2) ECHR authorises interventions which are "necessary in a democratic society […] for the protection of health or morals": it is not a warrant for lifestyle fascism. 18
Nevertheless, his judgement was overturned on appeal.
| HOSPITAL NO SMOKING POLICIES
In these policies and judicial comments, we can see a move from prevention of harm to others towards prevention of harm to the smoker himself. Similar justification can be found in official guidance covering smoking in acute hospitals: "Stopping smoking at any time has considerable health benefits for people using secondary care services" (NICE, 2013 p.6). There is a large amount of weak evidence detailed in the accompanying evidence document about impacts of bans on patients, e.g., frequency of violent episodes and use of restraint in mental health units. But there cannot be direct evidence for the important policy provision that smoking should be prohibited in hospital grounds, because it is a normative question. It does not follow from a fact that smoking bans can be implemented that they should be.
Considerably more time has been spent looking at the evidence than the values underpinning the policy, mirroring the asymmetry noted earlier in respect of nursing education standards. Evidence trumps philosophy.
In practice, general hospital bans can be quite aggressive. Here's one from Tameside Hospital. The first paragraph is firmly against Mill. Not criminalization, but power, directed at the patient through a caring and allegedly autonomous professional who knows the patient.
Smoking is a major cause of illness and early death and
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So I have suggested that the legal judgements subvert Mill's principle in a number of ways, and that secure in the legal judgement, hospital no smoking policies do the same. In the final section, I will consider how nursing staff might regard these sorts of policies. First, there are questions of detail to address. It is not clear, e.g., in the hospital policy, what "assisting patients" consist of. Elsewhere in the policy it is stated that: "All members of staff will be expected to reinforce the Trust's No Smoking Policy in circumstances which they are comfortable to do so" (para 7.5) and it is stated that staff should discourage patients from going outside (para 10.5). It does not say prevent-but nor could it as that would amount to false imprisonment. But it is very clear that no assistance should be given, and staff must not accompany patients or assist them. The Trust considers it more acceptable that a lifelong smoker is at risk of falling rather than be helped to where he can enjoy a lawful activity, and if he falls, it is his own fault. For further discussion see Snelling (2016b) 20 It's stated that "The Trust's duty to provide reasonable care to the patient will not be affected," and I presume that this has been subjected to legal opinion.
The question I want to consider is whether a nurse should assist a patient who wants to smoke, legally, outside. But, a few caveats: first, in the UK, the government nursing strategy emphasizes, at tedious length, the "6 Cs": Care, Compassion, Competence Communication, Courage, Commitment (Cummings & Bennett, 2012) . The "C" of critical thinking was not included, but the "C" of courage was. But for this exercise, I put to one side the fact that assisting the patient would put the individual's employment at risk. So we can recast the question as asking whether a nurse should want to assist. The second caveat concerns advocacy because I am aware that concepts of advocacy differ between North America and the UK. North American models of advocacy seem more advanced and also include an obligation to advocate more widely and at a higher level for social justice (Kagan, Smith, Cowling, & Chinn, 2010; Lipscomb, 2011) , and in relation to smoking policies, this could be argued both ways. So, we will recast the question again so that it refers to advocating for an individual patient rather than advocating at the higher level of policy making. The question I think illustrates the fundamental purpose of nursing. A patient asks for your assistance in taking him out for a cigarette.
There are a couple of ways of arguing in favour of the ban, that is of refusing assistance, remembering that the harm principle (or some- Mill's case in On Liberty and more widely in his utilitarianism is based empirically on human nature (Skorupski, 2006 21 so that when we say that we want to smoke we might not mean it. We can simultaneously want to smoke and want to run the race which requires that we do not (Coggon, 2007) . These insights about cognitive functioning can be seen in a range of places. They result in nudge techniques which apparently innocuously place salads before fries in works canteens (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008) , but have also been used to defend a more stringent version of coercive paternalism (Conly, 2013 ). Mill's dictum has been undermined not so much in rhetoric, but in practice. Scholarship about nudging is progressing fast, and for a non-specialist, it can be difficult to keep up. There's little, so far, in the nursing literature and more is needed. It is not simply a matter of transferring the ethics of nudging from medicine or from policy making, as nurses and nursing make special and specific claims about their relationships with patients and families, including a claim for advocacy and a claim for care over treatment. Both of these areas are challenged by nudging and the psychological insights which have fathered it. But, to be clear, the smoking bans discussed are not nudges; they are much more coercive that that, I simply make the point that a defence against the harm principle, (and respecting autonomy) along these lines seems plausible, but is not stated in any policy documents or legal judgements cited. Whatever the justification, I am claiming that a nurse defending a paternalist policy or declining to help a patient to have a cigarette should be able to base those judgements upon a detailed examination of motives and values.
Arguing against the ban in favour of assisting a patient seems to me to be a much simpler task. Return to Mill, and allow individuals to make up their own mind. When they have, advocate for them. It might not be the best thing for their physical health, narrowly understood, but who am I or you to judge how their life goes best for them?
Of course, this is a very simple version of a complex problem. The natures both of power and liberty differ between the agents in the chain that starts with the law, and progresses through guideline writers to employers and finally through nurses to patients. We can distinguish between different forms of liberty, as famously Isiah Berlin did.
No one is physically preventing a patient from getting off his bed and walking to a place where he can lawfully enjoy a cigarette without directly harming anyone else. Nurses are being forbidden from offering assistance to those who are unable to, being prevented from facilitating positive freedom:
I wish to be somebody, not nobody: a doer -deciding, not being decided for, self-directed and not acted upon […] that is of conceiving goals and policies of my own and realising them. (Berlin, 1958, p.178) .
The point about this dilemma is that you cannot hedge it. Admittedly, you could ask for more detail about a specific patient, and I could provide it. In discussion, that is often what people do, but some examples of policies say that there are no exceptions, or that there must be "exceptional" circumstances, and these are decided upon by clinicians. This has many effects for nurses and nursing as discussed in the pages of this journal recently. (Milliken, 2017; Paley, 2012) 22
See Gigereenzer (2015) for a discussion about understanding risk.
| CONCLUSION
I will conclude with brief consideration of the possibility of disagreement. From a patient point of view, it seems to me that they are en- 
